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237 
THE SPEAKER THE COURT FORGOT:  
RE-EVALUATING NLRA SECTION 8(b)(4)(B)’S 
SECONDARY BOYCOTT RESTRICTIONS IN 
LIGHT OF CITIZENS UNITED AND SORRELL 
―[C]ommercial speech doctrine is the last vigorous remnant of the 
attempt in the mid-twentieth century to incorporate a hierarchy of 
values into the First Amendment.‖1 
―On the ladder of First Amendment values, political speech 
occupies the top rung, commercial speech rests on the rung below, 
and labor speech is relegated to a ‗black hole‘ beneath the ladder.‖2 
INTRODUCTION 
In the staggeringly unpopular
3
 Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission
4
 decision, the Supreme Court overruled precedent
5
 and struck 
down a federal law that placed restrictions on campaign spending by 
corporations and unions.
6
 Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, observed 
that ―[t]he basic premise underlying the Court‘s ruling is . . . the 
proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinction based on 
a speaker‘s identity, including its ‗identity‘ as a corporation.‖7 Several 
commentators have argued that this basic premise will lead to the erosion 
or even the complete abandonment of the commercial speech doctrine,
8
 
 
 
 1. Darrel C. Menthe, The Marketplace Metaphor and Commercial Speech Doctrine: Or How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Citizens United, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 131, 133 (2011). 
 2. James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a 
Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 191 (1984). 
 3. See Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign 
Financing, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 pm, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html (―Eight in 10 poll respondents say they oppose the high 
court‘s . . . decision to allow unfettered corporate political spending, with 65 percent ‗strongly‘ 
opposed. Nearly as many backed congressional action to curb the ruling, with 72 percent in favor of 
reinstating limits.‖). 
 4. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 5. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 7. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice Stevens‘s characterization of the majority‘s reasoning is not a caricature. See infra text 
accompanying note 210. 
 8. See Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 16 (2010) (―The majority of the Court is sympathetic to the argument for 
more protection for commercial speech and Citizens United reflects that sympathy. It suggests that 
with the proper case, there is an increased likelihood the Supreme Court will either do away with the 
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which holds that commercial speech
9—―speech which does no more than 
propose a commercial transaction‖10—is a less protected form of speech 
under the First Amendment.
11
 As Tamara Piety, a fierce opponent of the 
deregulation of corporate and commercial speech,
12
 put it: ―[i]f a for-profit 
corporation is entitled to full First Amendment protection when it engages 
in political speech—speech which is in some sense peripheral to its 
existence—then it would seem [that] full protection for [commercial 
speech,] its core expressive activity[,] should follow.‖13 Piety‘s 
observation was prescient: in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
14
 decided barely a 
year and a half after Citizens United, the Supreme Court appears to have 
begun reformulating the commercial speech doctrine, reasoning that a 
Vermont statute regulating commercial speech warranted ―heightened 
judicial scrutiny‖ because the law ―impose[d] a content- and speaker-
based burden on . . . speech.‖15 
 
 
commercial speech doctrine altogether and declare that commercial speech should be treated as fully 
protected speech, or it will nominally retain the doctrine but apply strict scrutiny review.‖); Menthe, 
supra note 1, at 162 (―The Citizens United decision should finally break the back of commercial 
speech doctrine, which will be a reason to rejoice.‖). 
 9. ―There is not a very clear working definition of what commercial speech is.‖ Tamara R. 
Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2592 (2008). In 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Rights Counsel (Virginia Pharmacy), 
425 U.S. 748 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that ―speech which does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction‖ was commercial speech. Id. at 762 (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). But in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (Central 
Hudson), 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Court defined commercial speech as ―expression related solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.‖ Id. at 561. Later, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Court relied on three characteristics—the fact that the speech 
was an advertisement, the fact that it referred to a specific product, and the fact that the speaker had an 
economic motivation for the speech—to conclude that informational pamphlets were commercial 
speech. Id. at 66–67; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1125 (4th ed. 2011) (listing the three characteristics of commercial speech relied on by the Court in 
Bolger). ―No one . . . disagree[s] that advertising of prices for products is a form of commercial 
speech. The [unsettled] issue . . . [is] what other speech, besides price advertising, should be regarded 
as commercial speech.‖ CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 1125; cf. Piety, supra, at 2602 (―[T]he Court has 
never clearly articulated an alternative [to the Virginia Pharmacy] definition [of commercial speech], 
so many continue to allude to the ‗speech which does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.‘‖). 
 10. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 11. For a more thorough discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, see infra notes 227–31 
and accompanying text. 
 12. Cf. Piety, supra note 9, at 2588 (―[N]one of the proposed theoretical justifications for 
protecting freedom of expression support application of its most robust incarnation to for-profit 
corporations. To the contrary, a review of those theories leads to the conclusion that the interests the 
First Amendment was meant to protect are unlikely to be advanced by broad protection for the speech 
of for-profit corporations.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 13. Piety, supra note 8, at 19.  
 14. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 15. Id. at 2666 (emphasis added). As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, ―[the] Court 
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Sorrell suggests that the Court intends to adhere to Citizens United‘s 
basic premise and increasingly scrutinize—and strike down—restrictions 
on all forms of corporate speech.
16
 This leads to an obvious question 
without an obvious answer: if the First Amendment bars all regulatory 
distinction based on a speaker‘s identity, including its identity as a 
corporation, does it also bar all regulatory distinctions based on the 
speaker‘s identity as a labor union? If the Citizens United and Sorrell 
decisions existed in a legal, historical, and political vacuum, the answer to 
this question would surely be yes. After all, the law that the Court so 
vehemently struck down in Citizens United regulated the political 
expenditures of both corporations and unions.
17
 If the Court is now (albeit 
tacitly)
18
 applying Citizens United‘s rationale to commercial speech—
speech that is quintessentially an economic activity,
19
 not a form of self-
expression
20—it follows that union speech, whether on political or 
 
 
[has]. . . previously [never] applied any form of ‗heightened‘ scrutiny in any even roughly similar 
case.‖ Id. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Rather, the Court had ―applied a less than strict, 
‗intermediate‘ First Amendment test when the government directly restricts commercial speech. Under 
that test, government laws and regulations may significantly restrict speech, as long as they also 
‗directly advance‘ a ‗substantial‘ government interest that could not ‗be served as well by a more 
limited restriction.‘‖ Id. at 2674 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980)); see also infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text.  
 16. Cf. Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America: How the Roberts Supreme Court Is Using 
the First Amendment to Craft a Radical, Free-Market Jurisprudence, 23 DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF 
IDEAS 46, 51 (2011), available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/23/the_roberts_court_v_ 
america.pdf (discussing Sorrell and concluding that ―the reasoning of Sorrell puts [the] 
constitutionality [of many corporate regulations] in doubt‖). 
 17. Infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 18. Neither Sorrell‘s majority nor dissenting opinion mentions Citizens United, even though the 
parties in favor of striking down the Vermont law—and their supporters—relied on Citizens United in 
their briefs. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. at 23, Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 1149047 at *23 (citing Citizens United to 
support the argument that the Vermont law is presumptively invalid because it disfavors speakers and 
viewpoints); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. and Cato Inst. in Support of Respondents at 
20, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779) (citing Citizens United in support 
of the proposition that ―[r]elegating speech by those who have commercial interests to second-class 
status silences one side of a debate‖). Those who argued in favor of upholding the Vermont law also 
cited Citizens United, but relied on the political implications of the decision to advance their argument:  
In the wake of Citizens United, which confirms that corporations have a First Amendment 
right to political speech, there is no justification for specially protecting commercial speech 
too. If the pharmaceutical industry—one of the most politically active of all industries—does 
not like the Vermont statute, then it can spend money in the next election cycle to disseminate 
its side of the story. That is real First Amendment speech, not the commercial activity at issue 
in this case. 
Brief for Ass‘n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3–4, 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779) (citations omitted). 
 19. See supra note 9. 
 20. While it is beyond dispute that commercial speech is a form of expression, even the current 
Court would likely agree that corporate commercial speech it is not a form of self-expression. 
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economic matters, should be treated no differently by the Court than 
similar speech by corporations, non-corporate institutions, and individuals. 
But case law does not exist in a vacuum. For over half a century, the 
Supreme Court has evidenced a bias against union speech.
21
 The scope of 
this bias was eloquently conveyed by James Pope nearly three decades 
ago: 
[W]hile secondary boycott picketing by a civil rights organization 
demanding economic justice for blacks has been protected under the 
First Amendment, secondary boycott picketing by unions 
demanding economic justice for workers and protesting the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan has not. . . . Corporate speech may not be 
restricted solely on the ground that the speaker is a corporation, but 
labor picketing may be restricted under statutes that apply only to 
labor unions, leaving other groups free to engage in precisely the 
same activities. . . . Civil rights organizations have been accorded 
First Amendment protection against anti-communist affidavit 
requirements; labor unions have not. Civil rights organizations have 
been permitted to conduct sit-in protests against private business 
practices on private property, labor unions have not.
22
 
As noted by Pope, the double standard that the Court has applied to union 
speech is well illustrated in the context of secondary boycotts, which are 
 
 
Compare Self-Expression Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/self-
expression (last visited Oct. 8, 2011) (defining ―self-expression‖ as ―the expression or assertion of 
one’s own personality, as in conversation, behavior, poetry, or painting‖) (emphasis added), with FCC 
v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (―We do not usually speak of personal characteristics, 
personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal tragedy as referring to 
corporations or other artificial entities. This is not to say that corporations do not have correspondence, 
influence, or tragedies of their own, only that we do not use the word ‗personal‘ to describe them.‖). 
 21. Cf., e.g., James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to 
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (1987) (observing that, since the 1950s, ―the 
Supreme Court has, in effect, relegated labor protest to a black hole, not by casting it down, but by 
building up a body of [F]irst [A]mendment protections outside the labor area while leaving labor to the 
doctrines of the past‖ (footnotes omitted)); Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious 
Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984) (―Labor relations is the one area of law in 
which the policies of the [F]irst [A]mendment have been consistently ignored, reduced, and held to be 
outweighed by other interests. A ‗policy of limited expression‘ has been applied to pure speech and 
symbolic speech, to consumer picketing and employee boycotts, to political action and to the 
organizational activities of both labor and management. It has been woodenly applied by the National 
Labor Relations Board . . . , routinely enforced by the courts of appeals, and given its major impetus 
by the Supreme Court in a series of opinions notable for their failure to explain, rationalize, 
distinguish, or articulate useful standards.‖ (footnotes omitted)). For a thorough analysis and critique 
of the Supreme Court‘s labor speech jurisprudence, see generally Pope, supra note 2. 
 22. Pope, supra note 2, at 190–91 (footnotes omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/5
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restricted by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act.
23
 The 
term secondary boycott has been succinctly defined ―as a combination to 
influence A by exerting economic or social pressure against persons with 
whom A deals.‖24 The employer with which a union has a dispute is 
known as the ―primary‖ employer. During secondary boycotts, unions 
employ handbilling, picketing, or striking to put pressure on a ―secondary‖ 
employer—an employer ―with which the primary employer has a business 
relationship‖; ―the object of such pressure usually is to alter that business 
relationship to the detriment of the primary employer and thereby to raise 
the cost to the primary employer of continuing the labor dispute.‖25 The 
following example helps to illustrate how section 8(b)(4)(B) restricts 
unions‘ ability to engage in a secondary boycott. 
Imagine the following scenario
26
: two people stand in front of a Best 
Buy store, each carrying a sign. One of the two people is a unionist; her 
sign asks consumers to boycott the store because it sells iPads that are 
produced by non-union child labor in China.
27
 The second sign is carried 
by a Best Buy employee; her sign advertises that iPads are currently on 
sale in the store at a bargain price. While the store‘s advertising activity in 
this scenario is legal, the unionist‘s activity—known as secondary 
consumer picketing
28—is barred by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA 
because it is a form of secondary boycott.
29
 Even though this restriction is 
 
 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (2006). 
 24. Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section 
8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 907 (2005) (citing 
FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930)). 
 25. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 1741 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006) [hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW]. 
 26. This hypothetical is based on the scenario presented in James Gray Pope, The First 
Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right to Organize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 
RUTGERS L. REV. 941, 950–51 (1999). I have substituted iPads for the Furbys used in Pope‘s example 
but have not altered the substance of Pope‘s hypothetical. 
 27. See Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built Into an iPad, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-
human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html (―[T]he workers assembling iPhones, iPads and other devices 
often labor in harsh conditions, according to employees inside those plants, worker advocates and 
documents published by companies themselves. . . . Under-age workers have helped build Apple‘s 
products, and the company‘s suppliers have improperly disposed of hazardous waste and falsified 
records, according to company reports and advocacy groups that, within China, are often considered 
reliable, independent monitors.‖). 
 28. ―‗Secondary consumer picketing‘ takes place at the consumer entrances of a business legally 
neutral in the labor dispute publicized by the picket.‖ Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: 
Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 944 n.33 (1982); see also 
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 80 
(1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (defining secondary consumer picketing).  
 29. Pope, supra note 26, at 950. 
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―a textbook example of viewpoint discrimination,‖30 section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
has been upheld by the Court for over fifty years.
31
 
Now picture a third person in front of the store, also holding a sign. 
This person is a human rights activist; her sign instructs consumers to 
boycott Best Buy because it sells iPads, which are manufactured by Apple, 
a company that exploits Chinese workers. ―Like the unionist, the human 
rights activist is urging a secondary boycott of the store. However, her 
activity is not illegal under the [NLRA] because section 8(b)(4)(ii) applies 
only to unionists, leaving others to engage in precisely the same 
activities.‖32 Even under pre-Citizens United jurisprudence, labor scholars 
argued that—because section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) applies only to unions—it 
―violates the First Amendment principle of neutrality among speakers.‖33 
But this argument was slightly off the mark because the neutrality 
principle that served as the argument‘s foundation—the principle that 
―[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing 
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual‖34—was not consistently 
applied by the Court, even in the context of corporate political speech.
35
 
And before Sorrell, the neutrality principle had never been invoked to 
justify heightened scrutiny in a commercial speech case.
36
 Citizens 
United‘s re-affirmation of the neutrality principle in the context of 
corporate political speech and the Sorrell Court‘s prompt extension of that 
principle to corporate commercial speech indicates a sea change. 
But will the ripples of that change reach the shores of labor law? In 
light of the Supreme Court‘s historical anti-union bent, will the Court be 
willing to consistently apply the neutrality principle and re-evaluate its 
 
 
 30. Id. ―The unionist‘s message is illegal because it criticizes the store‘s policy of selling [iPads] 
and urges consumers to express their disapproval by taking their patronage elsewhere, while the store‘s 
message is legal because it approves the sale of [iPads] and urges consumers to patronize the store and 
take advantage of the low price . . . .‖ Id. 
 31. See infra Part I.C. 
 32. Pope, supra note 26, at 951. 
 33. Id. (citing First Nat‘l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978)). ―In short, the First 
Amendment principle of neutrality does not apply in the labor sphere.‖ Id. 
 34. First Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978). 
 35. Cf., e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (holding 
that independent expenditures by corporations can be restricted because of ―the unique state-conferred 
corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries‖ and the State‘s interest in 
―ensur[ing] that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by 
corporations‖), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 36. See supra note 15; cf. infra notes 228–31 and accompanying text. For a description of the 
varying levels of scrutiny—rational basis test, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny—used by 
courts to evaluate constitutional claims, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 552–54. 
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jurisprudence in the area of union speech? If the answer is no, this would 
indicate that the Court‘s rhetoric denouncing speaker-based restrictions is 
nothing more than a façade. When the Court deals with speech by labor 
unions, it will continue to find ways to uphold speaker-based restrictions 
on the union‘s expression by stating that the restrictions must be read so as 
to avoid Constitutional questions,
37
 or by labeling the expression as 
conduct rather than speech,
38
 or by asserting that the expression in 
question is too effective.
39
 But when the Court analyzes a restriction of 
corporate speech, it will conclude that the facial validity of the restriction 
simply must be considered,
40
 or proclaim that ―[t]he Government may 
not. . . deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself 
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration,‖41 or announce that 
the speech is subject to heightened scrutiny because it is content- and 
speaker-based.
42
 On the other hand, maybe the Court is prepared to harshly 
scrutinize all identity-based restrictions of speech—even restrictions that 
target labor unions. Indeed, the current Court has been praised for its 
―almost aggressive, pervasive and nearly unanimous protection of fairly 
basic First Amendment Principles‖ during the 2010 term.43  
Because further speculation on this point is likely fruitless, this Note 
will assume that there is at least a possibility that the Court is willing to 
seriously reconsider its First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of 
union speech. Given this optimistic assumption, this Note will argue that 
Citizen United‘s basic premise should lead the Court to strike down the 
restrictions on unions‘ use of secondary boycotts that are imposed by 
section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.
44
 The argument that section 8(b)(4)(B) 
 
 
 37. See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 39. Cf. infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 40. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 894 (―Citizens United‘s narrower 
arguments are not sustainable under a fair reading of the statute. In the exercise of its judicial 
responsibility, it is necessary then for the Court to consider the [statute‘s] facial validity . . . .‖); with 
id. at 932–33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―The [majority‘s] unnecessary 
resort to a facial inquiry ‗run[s] contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts 
should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor 
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applied.‘‖ (citation omitted)). 
 41. Id. at 899. 
 42. Cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2666 (2011) (―Vermont's law imposes a 
content- and speaker-based burden on respondents‘. . . speech. That consideration . . . requires 
heightened judicial scrutiny.‖). 
 43. David L. Hudson Jr., Center Stage for the First Amendment: Protecting Controversial 
Speech Shows a Libertarian Bent, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2011, at 20 (quoting Robert M. O‘Neil, founder of 
the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression in Charlottesville, Va.). 
 44. See Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech 
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violates the First Amendment is not a novel one.
45
 But it is an argument 
that needs to be reformulated in light of Citizens United and Sorrell 
because the Court‘s recent, seemingly unconditional embrace of the 
neutrality principle of the First Amendment provides union advocates with 
a powerful modern doctrine that makes section 8(b)(4)(B)‘s demise a 
distinct possibility.  
This Note argues (1) that Citizen United‘s neutrality principle in the 
context of corporate political speech should lead the Court to strike down 
the ban on political secondary boycotts and (2) that Sorrell‘s use of the 
neutrality principle in the context of corporate commercial speech should 
lead the Court to strike down restrictions on economic secondary boycotts 
or—at the very least—to apply heightened scrutiny to such boycotts. After 
providing a brief background on the history that led to the adoption of 
section 8(b)(4)(B), Part I of this Note examines the Supreme Court‘s 
interpretation of 8(b)(4)(B), focusing primarily on how the section has 
been applied in the context of secondary consumer picketing and political 
secondary boycotts. Part II discusses Citizens United, Sorrell, and the 
neutrality principle that is at the core of both decisions. Part III argues that, 
given the Court‘s invocation of the neutrality principle in the context of 
corporate political and commercial speech, there is no principled 
 
 
Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 18–24 (2011). This Note makes a similar—though narrower—
argument: while Garden‘s article only briefly discusses the implications of Citizens United on 
secondary boycotts and picketing, these implications are the focus of this Note. In addition, this Note 
goes beyond the Court‘s holding in Citizens United by incorporating the Court‘s recent commercial 
speech jurisprudence such as Sorrell, to buttress the argument that the Court‘s section 8(b)(4)(B) case 
law is anachronistic. See infra Part II.B. A recent comment by Joseph L. Guza does specifically focus 
section 8(b)(4)(B) and argues that, ―[g]iven the Court‘s reasoning in Citizens United, and given the 
fundamental political nature of labor speech, statutes that restrict labor speech because it is labor 
speech violate the First Amendment. Based on this line of reasoning, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is 
unconstitutional.‖ Joseph L. Guza, Comment, A Cure for Laryngitis: A First Amendment Challenge to 
the NLRA’s Ban on Secondary Picketing, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1267, 1302 (2011). (Guza also argues that 
section 8(b)(4)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 1306–11.) But Guza‘s argument is markedly 
different from the one advanced by this Note, because it relies on the premise that labor speech is 
political speech, and thus ―should be afforded the same protection as other types of political speech 
under the First Amendment.‖ Id. at 1294–99 (footnote omitted). While Guza‘s historical argument 
may be a strong one, it seems inconceivable that the Court will ever take the step of classifying all 
labor speech—or even all secondary labor picketing—as political. Even when the Court has 
acknowledged that a secondary boycott was politically motivated, it has held that such a political 
boycott was not entitled to First Amendment protection. See infra Part I.D.  
 45. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 2 (arguing, among other things, that restrictions on labor protests 
would not withstand the kind of First Amendment scrutiny that the Court applies to other forms of 
expression and proposing an alternative theory of the First Amendment and the expressive value of 
labor protests); Note, supra note 28 (arguing that non-coercive consumer picketing by labor unions is 
entitled to full First Amendment protection). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/5
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justification for upholding section 8(b)(4)(B)‘s secondary boycott 
restrictions.  
I. UNION SECONDARY BOYCOTTS AND SECTION 8(b)(4)(B)
46
 
A. The Long and Winding Road (to Section 8(b)(4)(B)) 
To understand section 8(b)(4)(B), it is necessary to appreciate the 
secondary boycott‘s utility to labor organizations. The secondary boycott 
gives labor unions the ability to exert indirect pressure on an employer: 
―instead of merely pressuring [the employer] directly with a strike, picket, 
handbill or other action, the labor organization pressures [the employer] 
indirectly, by making [the employer‘s] clients, suppliers, or other persons 
with whom [the employer] conducts business the target of such activity.‖47 
Because an effective secondary boycott places pressure on an employer 
from sources that would otherwise not be involved in the labor dispute, the 
secondary boycott is a powerful force multiplier.
48
 
The secondary boycott has been used by labor organizations 
throughout American history but was illegal
49
 until 1932, when the 
 
 
 46. For similar background sections on section 8(b)(4)(B), see, e.g., Guza, supra note 43, at 
1271–87; Dan Ganin, Note, A Mock Funeral for a First Amendment Double Standard: Containing 
Coercion in Secondary Labor Boycotts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1539, 1541–58 (2008); Tzvi Mackson-
Landsberg, Note, Is a Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful Secondary Picket Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
of the National Labor Relations Act?, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1519, 1531–40 (2007). 
 47. Bock, supra note 24, at 908. 
 48. Cf. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1746 (―The secondary boycott has long been 
one of the most effective weapons in labor‘s economic arsenal.‖). 
 49.  
Even before 1900, courts routinely held secondary boycotts unlawful as criminal 
conspiracies. Later, they were enjoined by courts of equity through broad application of 
antitrust law, part of a sweeping wave of anti-union sentiment culminating with the 
imposition of the Sherman Antitrust Act upon the activities of organized labor. Some of the 
earliest injunctions against union activities involved secondary components, and these cases 
played a major role in the doctrinal development of antitrust applicability to the right to strike, 
picket, and boycott.  
Bock, supra note 24, at 908 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, supra note 28, at 940 n.12 (describing 
the legal status of picketing in the nineteenth century as, ―at best, . . . a legitimate means of economic 
coercion, the legality of which depended on the economic objective of the union‖ (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1746–49 (describing 
the regulation of secondary activity before passage of the Taft-Hartley Act). Primary boycott activity 
was likewise considered illegal activity by many courts in the 19th and early 20th centuries. See Ken I. 
Kersch, How Conduct Became Speech and Speech Became Conduct: A Political Development Case 
Study in Labor Law and the Freedom of Speech, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 255, 273 (2006) (―In the 
constitutional law of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, labor boycotts, strikes, and 
pickets were simply understood not as speech but rather as conduct. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, labor unions seeking what would today be considered routine objectives would have been 
considered criminal conspirators.‖ (footnote omitted)); GEORGE GORHAM GROAT, ATTITUDE OF 
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passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
50
 ―put a statutory end to the use of 
injunctive relief [by federal courts] to stop a wide array of union activity, 
including the secondary boycott.‖51 The following year, seeking to 
―stimulate employment and promote changes which would make . . . 
another depression [unlikely],‖52 Congress enacted the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA).
53
 While the NIRA was promptly struck down by 
the Supreme Court,
54
 the National Labor Relations Act
55
 (NLRA or 
―Wagner Act‖) of 1935—containing several provisions that were nearly 
identical to the NIRA
56—was upheld by the Court,57 ―bec[oming] the first 
piece of New Deal legislation to pass constitutional muster‖58 and 
―inaugurat[ing] the modern era of American labor law.‖59 The Wagner Act 
(1) granted employees ―the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the 
 
 
AMERICAN COURTS IN LABOR CASES: A STUDY IN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 85 (Faculty of Political Sci. 
of Colum. Univ. ed., Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1911) (―That the weight of opinion is on the side of 
the illegality of the boycott seems not to be open to question.‖). It should be noted that ―secondary 
boycotts were not uniformly condemned.‖ DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1747. For 
example, ―[i]n New York the courts allowed pressure that did not ‗extend beyond a point where . . . the 
union‘s direct interests cease.‘‖ Id. 
 50. Norris-LaGuardia (Labor Disputes) Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115). 
 51. Bock, supra note 24, at 910 (citing RALPH M. DERESHINSKY ET AL., THE NLRB AND 
SECONDARY BOYCOTTS 2 (1981)); see also PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
415 (1964) (―The [Norris-LaGuardia Act] limited the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes by the 
federal courts, prohibited court injunctions against certain otherwise legal activities of unions, granted 
a jury trial to defendants in contempt cases committed outside of the court room, and compelled a 
change of venue when requested.‖). 
 52. TAFT, supra note 51, at 417.  
 53. National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Sta. 195 (1933), invalidated 
by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 54. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (finding the NIRA 
unconstitutional). 
 55. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 49 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169). 
 56. See Bock, supra note 24, at 911 (―The [Wagner Act] . . . contain[ed] essentially the same 
safeguards as those set forth in NIRA‘s section 7(a) . . . .‖). Compare Wagner Act § 7 (―Employees 
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection‖), with NIRA § 7(a)(1) 
(―Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or 
their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.‖). 
 57. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 58. Bock, supra note 24, at 911. 
 59. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1533 (2002). 
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purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection‖;60 
(2) banned ―unfair labor practices‖ by employers;61 (3) ―established a 
mechanism for the election and certification of representative labor 
organizations, based on the principle of majority rule‖;62 and (4) created 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or ―Board‖) ―to administer 
representation proceedings and to enforce the Act, subject to judicial 
review in the federal courts of appeals.‖63 
But the labor victory that the Wagner Act represented was short-lived. 
The rapid increase in union membership in the decade following the Act‘s 
passage resulted in a host of problems.
64
 The growing labor movement 
―was widely regarded as having ‗abused‘ its newfound power.‖65 ―In 
particular, critics pointed to unions‘ use of secondary boycotts and 
disruptive strikes, their insistence on closed-shop agreements, their 
involvement in jurisdictional disputes between unions, and, in some cases, 
their corruption.‖66 To deal with these abuses, Congress amended the 
NLRA by passing the Labor Management Relations Act
67
 (LMRA or 
―Taft-Hartley Act‖) in 1947. The Taft-Hartley amendments had a 
profound impact on labor law in general
68
 and a destructive long-term 
impact on collective bargaining in particular.
69
  
Among the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA was the prohibition 
of unfair labor practices by labor unions.
70
 Restrictions on unions‘ use of 
 
 
 60. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. 157 (2006). 
 61. See id. § 8 (defining five types of unfair labor practices by employers); id. § 10(a) 
(empowering the National Labor Relations Board ―to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair 
labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce‖). 
 62. Estlund, supra note 59, at 1533 (citing Wagner Act § 9).  
 63. Id. (citing Wagner Act §§ 3, 10). 
 64. TAFT, supra note 51, at 579 (―[A]buses of stewardship, jurisdictional strikes and the use of 
the secondary boycott, refusal of some unions to bargain in good faith, as well as the sharp rise in labor 
disputes in the immediate postwar period, created a widespread public demand for remedial action.‖). 
 65. Estlund, supra note 59, at 1534. 
 66. Id. at 1534 n.25 (emphasis added) (citing Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor 
Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 763–65 (1998). See also James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth 
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 
1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105–12 (2002)); supra note 64. 
 67. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 
(1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 68. See Estlund, supra note 59, at 1534 (―Taft-Hartley turned away from the forthright 
endorsement of collective bargaining and reframed the basic policy of the [NLRA] as favoring 
employee ‗free choice‘ with respect to unionization and collective bargaining.‖). 
 69. Cf. Lichtenstein, supra note 66, at 789 (1998) (―Industry-wide bargaining . . . collapsed in the 
early 1980s . . . . One cannot directly link the concession bargaining of those years to passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, but, taken as a whole, the 1947 labor statute established the structural framework 
which made such a bargaining debacle possible.‖). 
 70. See Taft-Hartley Act § 8(b) (defining union unfair labor practices). 
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the secondary boycott—described in section 8(b)(4)(B) of Taft-Hartley—
were among the newly formulated unfair labor practices. In 1959, 
Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act,
71
 closing various ―loopholes‖ 
left by Taft-Hartley
72
 and resulting in the present-day form of section 
8(b)(4)(B). Landrum-Griffin was the last substantial revision of the 
NLRA.
73
 
B. A Primer on Section 8(b)(4)(B) 
Section 8(b)(4) has been described as ―one of the most complex 
provisions‖ of the Taft-Hartley Act;74 this complexity is hidden within the 
fairly straightforward structure of the NLRA. Under section 10(a) of the 
NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board is empowered ―to prevent any 
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting 
commerce.‖75 Unfair labor practices by employers are defined in section 
8(a) of the Act,
76
 while unfair labor practices by labor organizations or 
their agents are defined in section 8(b).
77
  
The structure of 8(b)(4) is somewhat quirky; it contains four 
subsections ((A), (B), (C), and (D)) and two clauses ((i) and (ii)). The two 
clauses specify conduct which becomes an unfair labor practice if the 
union engaging in the conduct has one of the goals or objects specified in 
subsections (A) through (D).
78
 Section 8(b)(4)(B) can therefore be broken 
up into two clauses, each of which defines a conduct that becomes an 
unfair practice if combined with the object in subsection (B): ―[c]lause (i) 
prohibits a union from engaging in a strike or inducing an employee to 
 
 
 71. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 72. Bock, supra note 24, at 914; see DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1751–53 
(discussing the ―loopholes‖ that employers and members of Congress felt were weakening the Taft-
Hartley boycott provisions). 
 73. Estlund, supra note 59, at 1535. 
 74. BRUCE FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 296 (2000). 
 75. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006). 
 76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006). 
 77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006). 
 78. In addition to the objects in subsection (B), these ―unlawful‖ objects include ―forcing or 
requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or to enter 
into any agreement which is prohibited by [section 8(e)],‖ id. § 158(b)(4)(A), ―forcing or requiring any 
employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his 
employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees,‖ 
id. § 158(b)(4)(C), and ―forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a 
particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class . . . unless such employer is failing 
to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for 
employees performing such work,‖ id. § 158(b)(4)(D). 
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strike or otherwise refuse to work,‖ and ―[c]lause (ii) prohibits a union 
from threatening, restraining or coercing any person to engage in 
conduct‖79 if—in either case—an object of the union‘s conduct is to 
―forc[e] or requir[e] any person to cease using, selling, handling, 
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, 
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other 
person,‖ or to ―forc[e] or require[e] any other employer to recognize or 
bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees 
[if] such labor organization has [not] been certified as the representative of 
such employees.‖80 Note the distinction between the clauses: clause 
(ii) ―prohibits threats, et cetera, against any person, not just employees. 
This section thus prohibits union threats directly against an employer . . . . 
In contrast, clause (i) prohibits a union even from peacefully inducing or 
encouraging an employee to engage in a strike or other refusal to work, et 
cetera . . . .‖81 The NLRA provides for remedial measures if section 
8(b)(4)(B) is violated.
82
 
If read literally, section 8(b)(4)(B) could prevent all picketing by 
unions;
83
 ―[h]owever, the last sentence of [s]ection 8(b)(4)(B) contains a 
proviso protecting the right to engage in primary picketing or a primary 
strike ‗not otherwise unlawful.‘‖84 Secondary activity in the form of 
publicity such as handbilling is also partially protected by the ―publicity 
proviso‖ contained in section 8(b)(4).85 Since section 8(b)(4) applies only 
 
 
 79. FELDACKER, supra note 74, at 297 (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). 
 80. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 81. FELDACKER, supra note 74, at 297. 
 82. The NLRA ―provides that the Board‘s investigating officer must petition the federal court for 
an injunction if there are reasonable grounds for believing‖ that section 8(b)(4)(B) has been violated. 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1750. In addition, the NLRA specifies that section 8(b)(4) 
conduct by labor unions is unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (2006). ―An aggrieved party [is entitled] to 
sue for damages resulting from [such] activity,‖ DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1750 
(paraphrasing 29 U.S.C. § 187(b)). 
 83. FELDACKER, supra note 74, at 297; cf. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 82 (1983) (―Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s . . . recognized that certain 
of the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 could not possibly given their literal scope. The result was a 
narrowing, for instance, of the secondary boycott prohibitions.‖). 
 84. FELDACKER, supra note 74, at 298; 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B). 
 85. The publicity proviso states that nothing in section 8(b)(4) 
shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully 
advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product 
or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary 
dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an 
effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in 
the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to 
perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006).  
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to secondary activity,
86
 the Supreme Court has had to struggle with the 
fact that ―the distinction between legitimate ‗primary activity‘ and banned 
‗secondary activity‘ . . . does not present a glaringly bright line.‖87 Not 
surprisingly, this struggle has produced a complex body of case law as 
both the Court and the NLRB have been forced to draw lines between 
permissible primary activity and prohibited secondary activity.
88
  
C. Secondary Consumer Picketing Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
To understand the Court‘s section 8(b)(4)(B) jurisprudence, it is helpful 
to begin—as many commentators do89—with a case that pre-dates the 
section‘s enactment: Thornhill v. Alabama.90 In Thornhill, the Supreme 
Court struck down a state statute that prohibited the picketing of 
businesses.
91
 The case came before the Court after Thornhill, a worker 
who had peacefully picketed his employer‘s plant in accordance with his 
union‘s strike order,92 was convicted of violating the statute‘s 
prohibition.
93
 
 
 
 86. ―Congress did not seek, by § 8(b)(4), to interfere with the ordinary strike . . . .‖ Local 761, 
Int‘l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB (Local 761), 366 U.S. 667, 672 
(1961) (quoting NLRB v. Int‘l Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 672 (1951)). ―The impact of the 
section was directed toward what is known as the secondary boycott whose ‗sanctions bear, not upon 
the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it.‘‖ 
Id. at 672 (quoting Int‘l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F. 2d 34, 37 (1950)). 
 87. Local 761, 366 U.S. at 673. 
 88. As explained in the Introduction, this Note is primarily concerned with only two of the ways 
that section 8(b)(4)(B) has been applied: as a restriction on secondary consumer picketing and as a ban 
on political boycotts. For a thorough discussion of secondary activity falling under 8(b)(4), see 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1741–1868 and FELDACKER, supra note 74, at 296–341. 
For a thorough treatment of how the Board interprets and applies section 8(b)(4), see Bock, supra note 
24. 
 89. See, e.g., Note, supra note 28, at 941–44 (discussing and analyzing section 8(b)(4)(B) case 
law); Pope, supra note 2, at 219 (same). 
 90. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). While Thornhill was not a case involving 
secondary picketing, the decision could certainly have been interpreted to apply to secondary 
picketing. Cf. Note, supra note 28, at 941 (―Although its holding was on the narrow ground of 
overbreadth, Thornhill established that restrictions on picketing were subject to the constraints of the 
First Amendment.‖). Justice Murphy—the author of the majority opinion in Thornhill—―hoped that 
Thornhill would serve as ‗Labor‘s Magna Carta.‘‖ Pope, supra note 21, at 1092. 
 91. Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88. The statute in Thornhill also prohibited any person from  
go[ing] near to or loiter[ing] about the premise or place of business of any other person, firm, 
corporation, or association of people, engaged in a lawful business, for the purpose, or with 
the intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have 
business dealings with, or be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association.  
Id. at 91. 
 92. Id. at 93–94. 
 93. Id. at 91. 
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The Court noted that freedom of speech is ―among the fundamental 
personal rights and liberties,‖94 and observed that, when there is a claimed 
abridgement of that right, ―the courts should ‗weigh the circumstances‘ 
and ‗appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced‘ in support of the 
challenged regulations.‖95 With this tenet of statutory construction in 
mind, the Court concluded that the statute was ―invalid on its face.‖96 This 
conclusion was explicitly premised on the belief that speech regarding a 
labor dispute is speech regarding a matter of public concern: 
It is true that the rights of employers and employees to conduct their 
economic affairs and to compete with others for a share in the 
products of industry are subject to modification or qualification in 
the interests of the society in which they exist. . . . [But] [i]t does 
not follow that the State in dealing with the evils arising from 
industrial disputes may impair the effective exercise of the right to 
discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public 
concern. A contrary conclusion could be used to support 
abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press concerning 
almost every matter of importance to society.
97
 
The Court stated that its conclusion may have been different if the case 
had involved a ―narrowly drawn‖ statute that was meant to address ―clear 
and present danger of destruction of life or property, or [an] invasion of 
the right of privacy, or [a] breach of the peace.‖98 
Unfortunately for labor, Thornhill‘s impact on the Court‘s labor 
picketing jurisprudence was short-lived: even before the Landgrum-Griffin 
amendments created the present-day form of section 8(b)(4)(B), the Court 
―effectively withdrew protection for labor picketing associated with 
boycott activities.‖99 The Court frequently justified this by invoking—
among other things—the ―speech-plus‖ doctrine: picketing, which ―is a 
combination of speech and conduct, . . . is not ‗pure speech,‘‖ and is 
therefore not entitled ―to the same level of protection as . . . ‗pure 
speech.‘‖100 Rather than tracing these post-Thornhill developments in 
 
 
 94. Id. at 95. 
 95. Id. at 96 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 162 (1939)). 
 96. Id. at 101. 
 97. Id. at 103–04 (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at 105.  
 99. Pope, supra note 2, at 219. ―Within ten years, the Court had adopted an extremely lenient 
standard of constitutionality for restrictions on labor picketing: any picketing having an ‗illegal 
objective‘ was not protected by the First Amendment.‖ Note, supra note 28, at 942. For a discussion of 
this development, see id. at 942–44; see also Pope, supra note 2, at 219–20. 
 100. JOHN J. WHITEHEAD, THE RIGHT TO PICKET AND THE FREEDOM OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 75 
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detail, this Note will next examine the Court‘s application of section 
8(b)(4)(B) to secondary consumer boycotts; while the Court repeatedly 
refused to read section 8(b)(4)(B) in a way that would prohibit all 
secondary consumer picketing,
101
 the Court‘s approach was nonetheless a 
far cry from the lofty rhetoric of Thornhill. 
In 1964, the specific issue of the scope of the amended section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s prohibition on secondary consumer boycotts came before 
the Court in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 
760 (Tree Fruits).
102
 In Tree Fruits, the primary employers were firms that 
sold Washington State apples to Safeway, a chain of retail stores.
103
 A 
union representing the fruit and vegetable packers and warehouse workers 
called a strike
104
 ―in a dispute over the terms of the renewal of a collective 
bargaining agreement‖105 and—with the backing of other unions106—
―instituted a consumer boycott against the apples in support of the 
strike.‖107 This consumer boycott consisted of picketers who paraded in 
front of the entrances of forty-six Safeway stores while wearing placards 
and distributing handbills.
108
 The union‘s message was narrowly targeted 
at the struck product—the Washington State apples sold by the primary 
employers.
109
 Rather than asking the consumers not to shop at Safeway, 
the placards and handbills merely requested that the public not buy the 
Washington State apples, which were only one of many products sold at 
the stores.
110
  
 
 
(1984). For a discussion of the origins and development of the speech-plus doctrine, see id. at 75–81. 
 101. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 102. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 
(1964). Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) was not implicated in this case, since the secondary picketing ―‗was 
directed at consumers only, and was not intended to ―induce or encourage‖ employees . . . to engage in 
any kind of action . . . .‘‖ Id. at 61 n.5. 
 103. Id. at 59–60. 
 104. Id. at 59. 
 105. Id. at 59 n.2. 
 106. Id. at 60. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. There were only two picketers at each of forty-five stores and three picketers at the forty-
sixth store. Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. Indeed, the manager of each Safeway store received a letter  
informing him that the picketing was only an appeal to his customers not to buy Washington 
State apples, and that the pickets were being expressly instructed ―to patrol peacefully in front 
of the consumer entrances of the store, to stay away from the delivery entrances and not to 
interfere with the work of [the store‘s] employees, or with deliveries to or pickups from [the] 
store.‖ 
Id. at 61. The picketers received written instructions ―forbidd[ing] [them from] request[ing] that the 
customers not patronize the score,‖ and a copy of these instructions was also given to the store 
managers. Id. 
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Even though the picketing in this case was completely peaceful and did 
not hinder store employees‘ work, obstruct deliveries or pickups, or 
interfere with ―[i]ngress and egress by customers,‖111 the Court had no 
doubt that it would have been prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if the 
purpose of the picketing had been to persuade customers to stop all trade 
with Safeway.
112
 The issue before the Supreme Court was instead whether 
the unions violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) when their secondary picketing 
was not aimed at all of the products handled by the secondary employer, 
but was ―limited . . . to an appeal to the customers of the stores not to buy 
the products of [the primary employers] against which one of the [unions] 
was on strike.‖113 Based on its interpretation of the legislative history and 
the publicity proviso to section 8(b)(4)
114—which allows certain types of 
―publicity, other than picketing” during secondary boycotts115—the NLRB 
had held that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited all secondary consumer 
picketing.
116
 The court of appeals had rejected the Board‘s conclusions 
―and held that the statutory requirement of a showing that respondent‘s 
conduct would ‗threaten, coerce, or restrain‘ Safeway could only be 
satisfied by affirmative proof that a substantial economic impact on 
Safeway had occurred, or was likely to occur as a result of the conduct.‖117  
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan rejected both the Board‘s and 
the appellate court‘s interpretations of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and held that 
secondary consumer picketing that is ―confined . . . to persuading 
customers to cease buying the product of the primary employer‖ is not 
prohibited by the statute.
118
 Justice Brennan pointed out ―that a broad ban 
against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First 
Amendment,‖119 but side-stepped the need to address the constitutionality 
 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 63. The Court described how the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments 
indicated that they were intended to ―proscri[be] . . . peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites 
[when it was] use[d] to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in 
order to force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer.‖ Id. See also 
id. at 81 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (―[The majority] holds that although § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does 
automatically outlaw peaceful secondary consumer picketing aimed at all products handled by a 
secondary employer, Congress has not, with the ‗requisite clarity,‘ evinced a purpose to prohibit such 
picketing when directed only at the products of the primary employer.‖ (citations omitted)). 
 113. Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
 114. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 115. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 116. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 62. As the Court pointed out, the Board‘s interpretation of the statute 
―necessarily rested on the finding that Congress determined that [secondary consumer] picketing 
always threatens, coerces or restrains the secondary employer.‖ Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 71. 
 119. Id. at 63. 
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of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by stating that—regardless of plain language120—
the Court could not read a statute to ―outlaw peaceful picketing unless 
there is the clearest indication in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to do so as regards the particular ends of the picketing under 
review.‖121 Surveying the legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin 
amendments to section 8(b)(4),
122
 the Court concluded that ―the history 
shows that Congress was following its usual practice of legislating against 
peaceful picketing only to curb ‗isolated evils‘‖;123 according to Brennan, 
the ―isolated evil‖ in the case of secondary consumer picketing was ―its 
use to cut off the business of a secondary employer as a means of forcing 
him to stop doing business with the primary employer.‖124 Without citing 
any legislative history or case law, the Court then made a distinction 
between consumer picketing that ―is employed only to persuade customers 
not to buy the struck product‖ and consumer picketing that ―is employed 
to persuade customers not to trade at all with the secondary employer.‖125 
According to the Court, the former type of picketing is ―closely confined 
to the primary dispute‖ and ―[decreases] the secondary employer‘s 
purchases from the struck firms . . . only because the public has 
diminished its purchase of the struck product,‖ while the latter type of 
picketing ―creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer‖ 
because the secondary employer ―stops buying the struck product, not 
because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure designed to inflict 
injury on his business generally.‖126  
Agreeing with the dissent‘s conclusion that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
prohibits all secondary consumer picketing,
127
 Justice Black was the only 
 
 
 120. See id. at 71–72 (―While any diminution in Safeway‘s purchases of apples due to a drop in 
consumer demand might be said to be a result which causes respondents‘ picketing to fall literally 
within the statutory prohibition, ‗it is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute 
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.‘‖ 
(citations omitted)); cf. id. at 82 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (―The Union‘s activities are plainly within the 
letter of [section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)], and indeed the Court‘s opinion virtually concedes that much. . . . [But] 
[n]othing in the statute lends support to the fine distinction which the Court draws between general and 
limited product picketing.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 121. Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
 122. See id. at 64–71. 
 123. Id. at 71. 
 124. Id. at 68. 
 125. Id. at 72. 
 126. Id. (emphasis added). 
 127. Writing for the dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the distinction between ―general and 
limited product picketing‖ established by the Court ―is surely too refined in the context of reality,‖ and 
that nothing in the statute, or the legislative history supported the distinction. Id. at 82 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). Concluding that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does prohibit all secondary consumer picketing, 
Justice Harlan proceeded to address the constitutionality of such a prohibition. He dismissed the idea 
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member of the Court who argued ―that the section abridges freedom of 
speech and press in violation of the First Amendment.‖128 Quoting 
Thornhill, Black observed that ―the dissemination of information 
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area 
of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.‖129 
Acknowledging that ―patrolling is . . . conduct, not speech, and therefore is 
not directly protected by the First Amendment,‖ Black reasoned that when 
non-protected conduct such as patrolling ―is intertwined . . . with 
constitutionally protected free speech and press, regulation of the non-
protected conduct may at the same time encroach on freedom of speech 
and press‖130 and that ―it is the duty of courts, before upholding 
regulations of patrolling, to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the 
substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the 
free enjoyment of the rights of speech and press.‖131 Justice Black pointed 
out that this was ―neither a case in which picketing is banned because the 
picketers are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in which 
all picketing is, for reasons of public order, banned,‖ but rather ―a case in 
which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when the picketers 
express particular views.‖132 He argued that ―[t]he result is an abridgment 
of the freedom of these picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a 
labor controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is protected by 
the First Amendment.‖133 
Sixteen years after its holding in Tree Fruits, the Supreme Court once 
again examined the scope of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s prohibition of 
secondary consumer boycotts in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 
Local 1001, Retail Clerks International Ass’n, AFL-CIO (Safeco).134 The 
secondary consumer boycott in this case was initiated by a union that 
represented some employees of Safeco Title Insurance Co., a real estate 
title insurance underwriter.
135
 Safeco had business relationships with five 
 
 
that a general prohibition of secondary consumer picketing was ―inconsistent with the protections of 
the First Amendment, particularly when . . . other methods of communication are left open.‖ Id. at 93. 
By ―other methods of communication,‖ Harlan was referring to non-picketing publicity that is 
protected by the publicity proviso. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 128. Id. at 77 (Black, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. at 77 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130. Id. (Black, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 78 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132. Id. at 79 (Black, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. (Black, J., concurring). 
 134. 447 U.S. 607 (1980). 
 135. Id. at 609. 
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local title companies.
136
 These companies ―search[ed] land titles, 
perform[ed] escrow services, and [sold] title insurance‖; ―[o]ver 90% of 
their gross incomes derive[d] from the sale of Safeco insurance.‖137 As a 
result of stalled contract negotiations with Safeco, the union went on 
strike, picketing both Safeco‘s office and the offices of each of the five 
title companies,
138
 but ―direct[ing] its appeal [only] against Safeco 
insurance policies.‖139 Safeco and one of the title companies filed 
complaints with the NLRB, which found that, ―since the sale of [Safeco‘s] 
policies accounted for substantially all of the title companies‘ business, . . . 
the [u]nion‘s action was ‗reasonably calculated to induce customers not to 
patronize the neutral parties at all‘‖ and was therefore a violation of 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
140
 The union appealed the Board‘s decision; relying 
on Tree Fruits, the court of appeals naturally concluded that section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) offered no protection ―from secondary picketing against the 
consumption of products produced by an employer involved in a labor 
dispute.‖141  
The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that, because ―the [u]nion‘s 
secondary appeal against the central product sold by the title companies 
. . . is reasonably calculated to induce customers not to patronize the 
neutral parties at all[,] . . . [t]he resulting injury to their businesses is 
distinctly different from the injury . . . in Tree Fruits.‖142 According to the 
Court, ―successful secondary picketing would put the title companies to a 
choice between their survival and the severance of their ties with Safeco, 
. . . plainly violat[ing] [section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)].‖143  
 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 610. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 611. 
 142. Id. at 614 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143. Id. at 615. But not every member of the Court was convinced by this reasoning. Writing for 
the dissent, Justice Brennan argued that ―[t]he conceptual underpinnings of [the Court‘s] new standard 
are seriously flawed,‖ and outlined the fundamental problem with the Court‘s logic: 
The type of economic pressure exerted upon the secondary retailer by a primary product 
boycott is the same whatever the percentage of its business the primary product composes—
in each case, a decline in sales at the secondary outlet may well lead either to a decrease in 
purchases from the primary employer or to product substitution. 
Id. at 622 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan pointed out that ―it is far from clear that the harmfulness 
of a primary product boycott is necessarily correlated with the percentage of the secondary firm‘s 
business the product constitutes.‖ Id. Brennan was also concerned that ―[l]abor unions [would] no 
longer be able to assure that their secondary site picketing [was] lawful by restricting advocacy of a 
boycott to the primary product, as ordained by Tree Fruits,‖ id. at 623, and [would] instead ―be 
compelled to guess whether the primary proportion makes up a sufficient portion of the retailer‘s 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/5
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Although six of the justices agreed that the statute prohibited the 
union‘s conduct, a majority could not agree on why this prohibition did 
not conflict with the First Amendment. Writing for the plurality, Justice 
Powell argued that the prohibition was justified because secondary 
picketing furthers ―unlawful objectives‖ through the ―spread[ing] [of] 
labor discord by coercing a neutral party to join the fray,‖144 and relied on 
previous cases in which the Court ―expressly held that a prohibition on 
‗picketing in furtherance of [such] unlawful objectives‘ did not offend the 
First Amendment.‖145 Justice Blackmun concurred because of his 
―reluctan[ce] to hold unconstitutional Congress‘ striking of the delicate 
balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral 
employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced 
participation in industrial strife.‖146 Finally, Justice Stevens expressed 
―agree[ment] with the plurality that [section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s] content-
based restriction is permissible,‖ but he rejected the plurality‘s reasoning 
that this was simply because the restriction was ―in furtherance of the 
objectives deemed unlawful by Congress.‖147 Instead, Stevens argued that 
―picketing is a mixture of conduct and communication,‖ and that ―[i]n the 
labor context, it is the conduct element rather than the particular idea 
being expressed that often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third 
persons about to enter a business establishment.‖148 Because section 
 
 
business to trigger the displeasure of the courts or the Labor Relations Board,‖ id. at 624. The majority 
seemed untroubled by the new burden that it was placing on unions and the Board: 
If secondary picketing were directed against a product representing a major portion of a 
neutral‘s business, but significantly less than that represented by a single dominant product, 
neither Tree Fruits nor today‘s decision necessarily would control. The critical question 
would be whether, by encouraging customers to reject the struck product, the secondary 
appeal is reasonably likely to threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss. 
Resolution of the question in each case will be entrusted to the Board‘s expertise. 
Id. at 616–17 n.11.  
 144. Id. at 616. The ―neutral party‖ referred to by Justice Powell is the secondary employer—in 
this case, the five title companies. The ―unlawful objective‖ standard articulated by Justice Powell is 
sometimes also referred to as the ―illegal objective‖ standard or test. See Note, supra note 28, at 942. 
 145. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616 (quoting Int‘l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 
(1951)) (citing Am. Radio Ass‘n v. Mobile S.S. Ass‘n, 419 U.S. 215, 229–31 (1974); Teamsters v. 
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957)). 
 146. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
 147. Id. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring). As Justice Stevens pointed out, Congress cannot get 
around the requirements of the First Amendment by simply labeling ―the otherwise lawful expression 
of views‖ as ―unlawful‖ and therefore unprotected—―[o]therwise the First Amendment would place no 
limit on Congress‘ power.‖ Id. Rather, ―it is [the Court‘s] responsibility to determine whether the 
method or manner of expression, considered in context, justifies the particular restriction.‖ Id.; cf. 
Note, Free Enterprise Values, supra note 28, at 942–43 (describing the illegal objective test and 
criticizing it for being ―circular and wholly deferential to legislative action‖). 
 148. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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8(b)(4)(ii)(B) ―affects only that aspect of the union‘s efforts to 
communicate its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal, 
rather than a reasoned response to an idea‖ and ―is limited . . . to sites of 
neutrals in the labor dispute,‖ Stevens concluded that the statute‘s 
restrictions ―are sufficiently justified by the purpose to avoid embroiling 
neutrals in a third party‘s labor dispute.‖149 
While Tree Fruits and Safeco established the boundaries of permissible 
secondary consumer picketing, an important question was left 
unanswered: other than picketing, what other kind of ―coercive‖ conduct 
does section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibit? The Court addressed this issue in 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & 
Construction Trades Council.
150
 DeBartolo involved a union‘s dispute 
with H.J. High Construction Company (―High‖), which was hired by H.J. 
Wilson Company (―Wilson‖) to construct a department store in a mall 
owned by the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation (―DeBartolo‖).151 The 
union had a primary labor dispute with High over wages and benefits.
152
 In 
an attempt to put pressure on Wilson and High, the union peacefully—and 
―without any accompanying picketing or patrolling‖—handed out 
handbills at all four mall entrances.
153
 The handbills ―ask[ed] mall 
customers not to shop at any of the stores in the mall ‗until the Mall‘s 
owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done 
using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe 
benefits.‘‖154 Neither DeBartolo nor any of the other mall tenants had any 
say over the selection of contractors by Wilson,
155
 but the handbills did not 
inform consumers that the union‘s dispute was with Wilson and High, and 
the union did not limit the distribution of its handbills to the ―immediate 
vicinity of Wilson‘s construction site.‖156  
The NLRB held that the union‘s handbilling was prohibited by section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) because it ―constituted coercion‖ under its prior cases.157 
Noting that ―the Board‘s construction of the statute . . . poses serious 
questions of the validity of [section] 8(b)(4) under the First 
 
 
 149. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 150. 485 U.S. 568 (1988). 
 151. Id. at 570. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 571. 
 154. Id. at 570. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 571. 
 157. Id. at 573. 
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Amendment,‖158 the Court employed familiar methods to find a way out of 
invalidating section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). First, the Court distinguished 
handbilling targeting mall employees—which was prohibited by section 
8(b)(4)(i)(B)—from the handbilling in this case, which targeted mall 
customers only.
159
 The Court then focused on the facts before it and 
concluded that ―[t]here is no suggestion that the leaflets had any coercive 
effect on customers of the mall.‖160 Relying on Justice Stevens‘s conduct-
communication distinction in Safeco,
161
 the Court reasoned that 
handbilling is merely persuasive, unlike picketing which, due to its 
―conduct element,‖ is coercive.162 In doing so, the Court essentially 
equated picketing and patrolling with violence in terms of the coercive 
effects.
163
 Finally, the Court reviewed the legislative history of section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and concluded that there was no indication that Congress 
intended to prohibit peaceful handbilling.
164
 
Taken together, Tree Fruits, Safeco, and DeBartolo evidence a tortured 
logic. Secondary consumer picketing is coercive and generally forbidden. 
When such picketing targets only the products made by the primary 
employer, it is allowed unless the secondary employer can reasonably be 
expected to suffer substantial loss.
165
 Handbilling, on the other hand, is not 
coercive regardless of how much harm it inflicts (or may potentially 
inflict) on the secondary employer.
166
 Since DeBartolo, the Board and the 
 
 
 158. Id. at 575. The Court appeared troubled by the fact that the Board‘s holding would prohibit 
the peaceful distribution of ―handbills [that] truthfully revealed the existence of a labor dispute and 
urged potential customers of the mall to follow a wholly legal course of action, namely, not to 
patronize the retailers doing business in the mall.‖ Id. 
 159. See id. at 578 (―We note first that ‗induce[ing] or encourag[ing]‘ employees of the secondary 
employer to strike is proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(i). But more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a 
violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): that section requires a showing of threats, coercion, or restraints. Those 
words, we have said, are ‗nonspecific, indeed vague,‘ and should be interpreted with ‗caution‘ and not 
given a ‗broad sweep‘ . . . .‖). The distinction drawn by the Court rests on the difference in language 
between sections 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) prohibits unions and their 
agents from ―induc[ing] or encourage[ing] any individual employed by any person engaged in 
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce . . . to engage in, a strike or a refusal [to work],‖ while 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibits unions and their agents from ―threaten[ing], coerc[ing], or restrain[ing] 
any person.‖ 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). Long before it decided DeBartolo, the 
Supreme Court had concluded that ―[t]he words ‗induce or encourage‘ are broad enough to include in 
them every form of influence and persuasion,‖ and are larger in scope than the words ―restrain‖ and 
―coerce.‖ Int‘l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 701–03 (1951). 
 160. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 578. 
 161. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 162. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 580. 
 163. See id. at 578 (―There was no violence, picketing, or patrolling and only an attempt to 
persuade customers not to shop in the mall.‖). 
 164. Id. at 583–88. 
 165. See supra notes 125–26, 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
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lower appellate courts have been forced to sort out this mess without help 
from the Supreme Court. The courts of appeals have (not surprisingly) 
come to different conclusions as to whether different types of secondary 
boycott activity are more like picketing—and therefore prohibited—or 
more like handbilling, and therefore permissible.
167
 As a final example of 
the confused case law dealing with section 8(b)(4)(B), the next part briefly 
details the Court‘s application of the statute to prohibit political boycotts. 
D. Political Boycotts Under Section 8(b)(4)(B) 
In International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO v. Allied 
International, Inc. (ILA),
168
 the Court faced the question of ―whether a 
refusal by an American longshoremen‘s union to unload cargoes shipped 
from the Soviet Union is an illegal secondary boycott under [section] 
8(b)(4).‖169 In ILA, ―the president of the International Longshoremen‘s 
Association (ILA), ordered ILA members to stop handling cargoes 
arriving from or destined for the Soviet Union‖ in order ―to protest the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan.‖170 As a result, ―longshoremen up and 
down the east and gulf coasts refused to service ships carrying Russian 
cargoes.‖171 This boycott disrupted the shipments of Allied International, 
Inc. (Allied), ―an American company that import[ed] Russian wood 
products for resale in the United States.‖172 ―Allied was forced to 
renegotiate its Russian contracts, substantially reducing its purchases and 
jeopardizing its ability to supply its own customers.‖173 After being 
informed ―that ILA members would continue to refuse to unload any 
 
 
 167. Compare, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 439 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that a mock funeral in furtherance of a secondary consumer boycott of a 
hospital ―was not ‗threaten[ing], coerc[ive], or restrain[ing],‘ in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‖), 
with Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that ―there is reasonable cause to believe that [a] [u]nion violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‖ 
when it staged a mock funeral in furtherance of a secondary consumer boycott of a hospital). For a 
discussion of the differing approaches that the D.C. Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit took in 
determining whether mock funerals violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), see Dan Ganin, A Mock Funeral for 
a First Amendment Double Standard: Containing Coercion in Secondary Labor Boycotts, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 1539, 1558–61 (2008).  
 168. 456 U.S. 212 (1982). 
 169. Id. at 214. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 215. 
 172. Id. Allied had contracted with Waterman Steamship Lines (―Waterman‖) for shipment of the 
wood from Russia to the United States. Id. Waterman employed John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc. 
(―Clark‖), ―to unload its ships docking in Boston.‖ Id. It was Clark who had hired ILA members as 
longshoring employees under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. Id. 
 173. Id. at 215–16. 
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Russian cargo,‖ Allied sued ILA for damages in district court, ―[c]laiming 
that the boycott violated the prohibition against secondary boycotts in 
[section] 8(b)(4).‖174 Finding that ―the ILA boycott [was] a purely 
political, primary boycott of Russian goods,‖ the district court dismissed 
the complaint.
175
 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the ILA 
boycott was prohibited, ―despite its political purpose, and that resort to 
such behavior was not protected activity under the First Amendment.‖176 
In contrast to its non-literal interpretation of section 8(b)(4)(B) in Tree 
Fruits,
177
 the Supreme Court relied on the plain language of the statute, 
stating: ―[t]he secondary boycott provisions in [section] 8(b)(4)(B) 
prohibit a union from inducing employees to refuse to handle goods with 
the object of forcing any person to cease doing business with any other 
person. By its terms the statutory prohibition applies to the undisputed 
facts of [this] case.‖178 Acknowledging that the purpose of ILA‘s boycott 
may not have been to negatively affect Allied‘s business, but ―simply to 
free ILA members from the morally repugnant duty of handling Russian 
goods,‖ the Court reasoned that this ―argument misses the point.‖ ―[W]hen 
a purely secondary boycott reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral 
parties with ruin or substantial loss, the pressure on secondary parties must 
be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott or the statutory 
prohibition would be rendered meaningless.‖179 Rather than looking—as in 
previous cases—at whether the statute clearly indicated that Congress 
intended to prohibit political boycotts, the Court instead looked for 
evidence that Congress did not intend to prohibit political boycotts and 
concluded that, ―[i]n the absence of any limiting language in the statute or 
legislative history, [there is] no reason to conclude that Congress intended 
such a potentially expansive exception to a statutory provision 
purposefully drafted in broadest terms.‖180 The Court appeared outraged 
―that a national labor union ha[d] chosen to marshal against neutral parties 
the considerable powers derived by its locals and itself under the federal 
 
 
 174. Id. at 216. Allied was able to bring this action in district court under section 303 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act. Id. at 216; Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. 
L. No. 80-101, § 303, 61 Stat. 136, 158–59 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 187)). 
 175. ILA, 456 U.S. at 217. 
 176. Id. at 218. 
 177. See supra note 120; see also supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.  
 178. ILA, 456 U.S. at 222. 
 179. Id. at 224 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 180. Id. at 225. The Court explained that ―accept[ing] the argument that ‗political‘ boycotts are 
exempt from the secondary boycott provision‖ would ―create a large and undefinable exception to the 
statute‖ and that ―[t]he distinction between labor and political objectives would be difficult to draw in 
many cases.‖ Id.  
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labor laws in aid of a random political objective far removed from what 
has traditionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate union 
activity.‖181 
The Court hastily dismissed the argument that its application of section 
8(b)(4) to ILA‘s boycott ―infringe[s] upon the First Amendment rights of 
the ILA and its members.‖182 Since the Court ―ha[d] consistently rejected 
the claim that secondary picketing by labor unions . . . is protected activity 
under the First Amendment,‖ the Court saw no reason why ILA‘s 
activity—―conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce‖—should 
be protected by the First Amendment.
183
 According to the Court, ―[t]here 
are many ways in which a union and its individual members may express 
their opposition to Russian foreign policy without infringing upon the 
rights of others.‖184 
The Court‘s ruling in ILA would seem less shocking if not for its ruling 
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,
185
 a case decided in the same year. The 
events that led to the litigation in Claiborne were initiated when black 
citizens of Claiborne County ―presented white elected officials with a list 
of particularized demands for racial equality and integration.‖186 The 
officials did not respond favorably, and at a subsequent NAACP meeting, 
―several hundred black persons voted to place a boycott on white 
merchants in the area.‖187 Three years into the boycott, seventeen of the 
merchants ―filed suit in state court to recover losses caused by the boycott 
and to enjoin future boycott activity‖; two corporations and 146 
individuals were named as defendants.
188
 The Mississippi Supreme Court 
partially upheld the trial court‘s imposition of liability on the basis of a 
common-law tort theory because some of the boycott participants had used 
force and violence to effectuate the boycott.
189
 
 
 
 181. Id. at 225–26 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 182. Id. at 226. 
 183. Id. at 226–27. 
 184. Id. at 227. The Court failed to identify exactly what ―rights‖ the ILA was infringing on in this 
case. 
 185. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 186. Id. at 889. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 894. Because some of the defendants ―engaged in acts of physical force and violence 
against the persons and property of certain customers and prospective customers,‖ the Mississippi 
Supreme Court had concluded that ―the evidence show[ed] that the volition of many black persons was 
overcome out of sheer fear, and they were forced and compelled against their personal wills to 
withhold their trade and business intercourse from the complainants.‖ Id. at 894–95 (emphasis added). 
This finding led the court to ―conclude[] that the entire boycott was unlawful.‖ Id. at 895. The court 
did, however, dismiss thirty-eight of the defendants. Id. at 896. 
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that individuals could be held liable 
for their own violent conduct, but rejected the notion that collective 
liability could be imposed for these acts without ―findings that adequately 
disclose the evidentiary basis for concluding that specific parties agreed to 
use unlawful means, that carefully identify the impact of such unlawful 
conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding the imposition of 
punishment for constitutionally protected activity.‖190 The Court 
somewhat unconvincingly distinguished its section 8(b)(4)(B) 
jurisprudence by once again relying on the conclusory statement that 
―[s]econdary boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited[] 
as part of ‗Congress‘ striking of the delicate balance between union 
freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, 
and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial 
strife.‘‖191 The Court continued: 
While States have broad power to regulate economic activity, we do 
not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity 
such as that found in the boycott in this case. This Court has 
recognized that expression on public issues has always rested on the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values. [S]peech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government.
192
 
But in both ILA and Claiborne, the Court never explained why, when 
evaluating the constitutionality of limits on secondary boycott activity, the 
Court must focus on the economic effects of unions‘ activity while 
disregarding such effects and focusing on the political purpose of such 
activity when engaged in by civil rights groups. The speech of civil rights 
protestors, however, is not the only type of speech that the Supreme Court 
seems to prefer to union speech. The next part of this Note describes 
Citizen United‘s seemingly unconditional protection of corporate speech 
in the form of campaign financing and the spillover effect of the Court‘s 
reasoning in Citizen United into the realm of corporate commercial 
speech.   
 
 
 190. Id. at 933–34. 
 191. Id. at 912 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617–
18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 192. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 913 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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II. ―CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE, MY FRIEND‖193: CITIZENS UNITED‘S 
SPEAKER-BASED ANALYSIS AND THE EMERGING CORPORATE 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
A. Citizens United 
The ―headline version‖ of the Court‘s holding in Citizens United is 
―that corporations may use their general treasury funds to finance 
independent expenditures and electioneering communications that 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates 
for public office.‖194 For purposes of this Note, what is most relevant 
about Citizens United is the principle that the majority relied on to arrive 
at this holding: ―[t]he First Amendment does not permit Congress to 
make. . . categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the 
speaker.‖195 The facts of Citizens United are straightforward. During the 
2008 presidential primary elections, Citizens United—a nonprofit 
corporation—released a 90-minute documentary about Hillary Clinton, 
who was one of the Democratic candidates.
196
 The movie ―was released in 
theatres and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution 
by making it available through video-on-demand.‖197 Citizens United also 
wished ―to promote the video-on-demand offering by running 
advertisements on broadcast and cable television.‖198 Citizens United 
wanted to make the movie ―available through video-on-demand within 30 
days of the 2008 primary elections,‖ but worried that this would be a 
violation of a federal law that prohibited corporations and unions from 
using their general treasury funds for express advocacy or ―electioneering 
communication‖199—which meant any publicly distributed200 ―‗broadcast, 
 
 
 193. The phrase ―corporations are people, my friend,‖ was Republican Presidential Candidate Mitt 
Romney‘s response to a heckler who was ―apparently urging Romney to raise taxes on corporations 
that have benefited from loopholes in the tax code.‖ Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says “Corporations 
Are People” at Iowa State Fair, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/mitt-romney-says-corporations-are-people/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html. Romney‘s 
comment ―stirred a brief but intense controversy.‖ Gary Gutting, Corporations, People and Truth, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011, 2:19 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/corporations-
people-and-truth. 
 194. Frances R. Hill, Implications of Citizens United for the 2010 Election and Beyond, SS019 
ALI-ABA 103, 105 (2010). 
 195. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
 196. Id. at 887. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.  
 199. See 29 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). 
 200. The requirement that the broadcast, cable, or satellite communication be ―publicly 
distributed‖ was specified in FEC regulations. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 11 C.F.R 
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cable, or satellite communication‘ that ‗refers to a clearly identified 
candidate for federal office‘ and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 
days of a general election.‖201 Seeking a declaratory injunction against the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC), Citizens United claimed that the 
federal law was unconstitutional as applied to the movie.
202
 As Citizens 
United argued
203—and as was pointed out by Justice Stevens in his 
dissent
204—the Court could have resolved the case on narrower grounds 
without invalidating the statute or overturning precedent, thereby allowing 
Citizens United to broadcast the movie and the ads and avoiding the 
constitutional issue. Alternatively, the ―straightforward path‖ proposed by 
Justice Stevens would have been for the Court to adhere to the precedent 
set by Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
205—in which the Court 
held that corporations could be prohibited from using general corporate 
treasury funds for independent expenditures that support or oppose 
candidates during an election
206—and ―hold[] that the funding of Citizen 
United‘s film can be regulated.‖207 
Rather than taking this straightforward path, the majority overruled 
Austin
208
 and invalidated the challenged statute.
209
 Justice Kennedy, 
 
 
§ 100.29(a)(2) (2009)). ―‗In the case of a candidate for nomination for President . . . publicly 
distributed mean[t]‘ that the communication ‗[could] be received by 50,000 or more persons in a State 
where a primary election . . . is being held within 30 days.‖ Id. (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii)). 
 201. Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(4)(A) (2006)). 
 202. Id. at 888. Citizens United also argued that certain disclaimer and disclosure requirements in 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 were unconstitutional as applied to the movie and the 
ads for the movie. Id. The Court rejected this argument and found the statutory requirements valid. Id. 
at 914. 
 203. Citizens United argued that the movie did not qualify as an ―electioneering communication‖ 
both as a matter of statutory interpretation and precedent. Id. at 888–89. In addition, it argued that the 
statute ―should be invalidated as applied to movies shown through video-on-demand, [because] this 
delivery system has a lower risk of distorting the political process than do television ads,‖ and that an 
exception should be created to the expenditure ban ―for nonprofit corporate political speech funded 
overwhelmingly by individuals.‖ Id. at 890–91.  
 204. See id. at 936–38 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing narrower 
grounds of decision that the majority could have adopted). 
 205. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 206. Austin, 492 U.S. at 655. The Michigan statute that was at issue in Austin—the Michigan 
Campaign Finance Act—defined an independent expenditure as one that ―is not made at the direction 
of, or under the control of, another person and . . . is not a contribution to a committee.‖ Id. at 655. The 
Act ―d[id] not impose an absolute ban on all forms of corporate political spending but permit[ted] 
corporations to make independent political expenditures through separate segregated funds.‖ Id. at 
660. In addition, the Act contained a ―media exception‖ under which media corporations were 
exempted from the expenditure restriction. Id. at 666–67. 
 207. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 938 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 208. Id. at 913. The majority also overruled the part of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), 
which had relied on the holding in Austin. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 209. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
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writing for the majority, was unequivocal in rejecting Austin: ―the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the 
speaker‘s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies 
limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.‖210 
The Court justified its abandonment of precedent mainly
211
 by relying on 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.
212
 In Bellotti, a case that pre-
dated Austin, the Court had invalidated
213
 a Massachusetts criminal statute 
that ―prohibited . . . [specified business corporations] from making 
contributions or expenditures for the purpose of . . . influencing or 
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one 
materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the 
corporation.‖214 According to the Citizens United majority, the principle 
behind Bellotti was both clear and compelling: ―the Government lacks the 
power to ban corporations from speaking.‖215 
For purposes of the analysis below, two final points should be noted. 
The first is the majority‘s rejection of the argument—relied on in Austin—
that individuals are distinguishable from corporations for First 
Amendment purposes because ―‗[s]tate law grants corporations special 
advantages-such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment 
of the accumulation and distribution of assets.‘‖216 According to the Court, 
―‗[i]t is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those 
special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.‘‖217 Second, 
it is important to note that none of the opinions in Citizens United even 
mention the possibility of applying the speech-conduct distinction in the 
context of campaign expenditures. This equating of money with speech is 
a legacy of Buckley v. Valeo,
218
 in which the Court famously upheld 
individual campaign contribution limits, while holding that that 
―limitations on campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by 
individuals and groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from his 
 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. As Justice Stevens pointed out, the majority ―justif[ied] its claim‖ that ―Austin [was] ‗a 
significant departure from ancient First Amendment principles‘‖ by relying on ―[s]elected passages 
from two cases, Buckley [v. Valeo] and Bellotti,‖ but the majority placed ―greater weight‖ on Bellotti. 
Id. at 957–58 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 212. First Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).  
 213. Id. at 795. 
 214. Id. at 767–68 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 215. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903. 
 216. Id. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1989)). 
 217. Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  
 218. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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personal funds are [unconstitutional].‖219 It was in Buckley that the Court 
explicitly rejected the argument that giving and spending money in 
political campaigns was a form of conduct, not speech, stating: ―this Court 
has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the 
expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or 
to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.‖220 
As stated above, what is most significant about Citizens United for 
purposes of this Note is the majority‘s unconditional embrace and 
sweeping application of the principle that Government may not suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker‘s corporate identity. Nothing in 
the majority‘s opinion suggests that this principle does not apply equally 
to invalidate laws that suppress the political speech of labor unions.
221
 At 
the very least, then, it seems that Citizens United should lead the Court to 
re-interpret section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA so as to allow political 
boycotts by labor unions.
222
 This leads to a difficult question: is the Court 
willing to extend Citizens United‘s rationale into the realm of non-political 
 
 
 219. Id. at 14. 
 220. Id. at 16. The Buckley Court reasoned that 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today‘s 
mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or 
leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate 
hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate‘s increasing dependence on television, 
radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of 
communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech. 
Id. at 19; see also id. at 65 n.76 (―[M]oney is a neutral element not always associated with speech but a 
necessary and integral part of many, perhaps most, forms of communication.‖). 
 221. In fact, the majority relied on a string of cases that dealt with speech by labor unions in order 
illustrate why ―the Court did not reach the question whether restrictions on corporate and union 
expenditures are constitutional‖ until the late 1970s. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900–01; see id. at 
900–01 (discussing cases in which the Court avoided declined to address this issue). Similarly, the 
majority relied several times on excerpts from decisions that equated union speech with corporate 
speech. For example, the majority quoted the dissenting opinion in United States v. Automobile 
Workers, 352 U. S. 567 (1957), in which ―the dissent concluded that deeming a particular group ‗too 
powerful‘ was not a ‗justificatio[n] for withholding First Amendment rights from any group—labor or 
corporate,‘‖ Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901 (quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. at 597 
(Douglas, J., dissenting)). The majority also cited Bellotti for the proposition that ―the worth of speech 
‗does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or 
individual,‘‖ id. at 904 (emphasis added) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777). See also id. at 919 
(Roberts, J., concurring) (―The text and purpose of the First Amendment point in the same direction: 
Congress may not prohibit political speech, even if the speaker is a corporation or union.‖) (emphasis 
added).  
 222. See infra Part III. 
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speech and invalidate all of section 8(b)(4)(B)? The next part of this Note 
offers one reason to think that the answer to this question is yes. 
B. Sorrell’s Extension of Corporate Personhood into the Realm of 
Commercial Speech
223
 
In a series of cases beginning with Bigelow v. Virginia
224
 in 1975, the 
Supreme Court first extended the protections of the First Amendment to 
commercial speech
225—most commonly defined as speech which does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.
226
 The commercial speech 
doctrine was created the following year in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Virginia 
Pharmacy).
227
 Under this doctrine, ―[c]ommercial speech is offered less 
protection than political or other quintessentially protected speech, but 
regulation directed at this speech must meet an intermediate scrutiny 
test.‖228 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission,
229
 ―the Court set out the four-part test for commercial speech 
still applicable today (albeit more strictly interpreted).‖230 In order to be 
considered protected speech under the Central Hudson test,  
the [commercial] speech in question must (1) concern a legal 
activity and not be misleading (that is it must be truthful speech 
about a legal activity); (2) if the government seeks to regulate that 
speech it must do so pursuant to a ―substantial interest‖; (3) such 
legislation must directly further the substantial interest in question; 
 
 
 223. This part will also provide some background on the commercial speech doctrine, as 
established by cases such as Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), Central Hudson & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), and Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484 (1996). 
 224. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 225. In Bigelow, the Court first stated that advertising was entitled to First Amendment protection. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1122. However, the Court refused to ―decide . . . the precise extent to 
which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may 
legitimately regulate or even prohibit.‖ Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825. 
 226. See supra notes 9–10.  
 227. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see Piety, supra note 9, at 2599 (―Most observers agree the 
[commercial speech] doctrine was created in 1976 in the Virginia Pharmacy case.‖ (citations omitted). 
 228. Piety, supra note 9, at 2599. Piety notes that, ―over the last couple of decades, [intermediate 
scrutiny] has begun to look a lot more like strict scrutiny.‖ Id. (citing David Vladeck, Lessons From A 
Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1055–59 (2004)). 
 229. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 230. Piety, supra note 9, at 2601 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557). 
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and (4) the regulation must be no more expansive than necessary to 
advance that substantial interest (often described as ―fit‖).231 
While it has not yet abandoned the Central Hudson test, in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc.,
232
 the Court appears to have tacitly extended Citizen United‘s 
logic into the arena of commercial speech. In Sorrell, three Vermont data 
miners
233
 and an association of pharmaceutical manufacturers
234
 
challenged a Vermont statute ―that sought to restrict the access of 
pharmaceutical companies to information about the prescribing habits of 
Vermont doctors.‖235 This type of information is valued by drug 
companies ―because it permits them to identify those doctors most likely 
to prescribe drugs, and because it allows them to ascertain how best to 
present their sales pitches when making sales calls at the doctors‘ 
offices—a process called ‗detailing.‘‖236 Vermont justified the law on two 
grounds: first, ―that [the] law was necessary to protect medical privacy, 
including physician confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the 
integrity of the doctor-patient relationship,‖ and second, that the law 
―[wa]s integral to the achievement of public policy objectives—namely, 
improved public health and reduced health care costs.‖237 In essence, the 
Vermont legislature had ―concluded that by restricting access to 
prescriber-identifying information, it could interfere sufficiently with the 
detailing process to effect a shift in overall drug sales away from brand-
name drugs and toward lower-priced generic drugs (which Vermont 
concluded were often at least as safe and effective as equivalent brand-
name drugs).‖238 
 
 
 231. Id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). 
 232. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 233. Data miners are ―firms that analyze prescriber-identifying information and produce reports 
on prescriber behavior. . . . Data miners lease these reports to pharmaceutical manufacturers subject to 
nondisclosure agreements.‖ Id. at 2660. 
 234. Id. at 2661. 
 235. Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 
2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 130 (2011). More specifically, the Vermont statute prohibited 
―pharmacies and several other entities‖ from ―sell[ing] . . . regulated records containing prescriber-
identifiable information‖ and ―permit[ting] the use of [such] records . . . for marketing or promoting a 
prescription drug, unless the prescriber consents.‖ Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The statute also barred pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
pharmaceutical marketers from ―us[ing] prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or 
promoting a prescription drug [without] the prescriber[‗s] consent[].‖ Id. at 2660 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 236. Samp, supra note 235, at 130; see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2656 (describing the detailing 
process used by pharmaceutical manufacturers). 
 237. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 238. Samp, supra note 235, at 130; see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (describing Vermont‘s 
policy goals); id. at 2682 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reviewing the legislative record supporting 
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In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the Vermont law 
after concluding that the statute ―d[id] not advance the State‘s asserted 
interest in physician confidentiality‖239 and did not advance the goals of 
lowering medical costs and promoting public health in a permissible 
way.
240
 While the Court could have perhaps reached the same decision by 
straightforwardly applying the Central Hudson test, the significance of 
Sorrell lies in the fact that ―the Court went well beyond a typical Central 
Hudson analysis in its discussion of speech restrictions based on the 
content of the speech and the identity of the speaker.‖241 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Kennedy began the opinion by seemingly jettisoning the 
intermediate scrutiny analysis that had previously been applied to 
commercial speech by stating that ―Vermont‘s statute must be subjected to 
heightened judicial scrutiny‖ because ―[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical 
marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment.‖242 The Court explained that heightened judicial 
scrutiny was warranted because the Vermont statute ―is designed to 
impose a specific, content-based burden on protected expression,‖243 but 
also stated that heightened scrutiny was justified because the law ―imposes 
a content- and speaker-based burden on . . . speech.‖244 It is therefore not 
clear whether the majority believes that just one or both types of burdens 
must be present before heightened scrutiny is required.  
What is clear is that the Court at least partly relied on Citizen United‘s 
basic premise—―the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory 
distinction based on a speaker‘s identity, including its identity as a 
corporation‖245—in striking down the Vermont statute. In addressing the 
question of whether the Court‘s consideration of the statute required 
 
 
Vermont‘s conclusion that the statute furthered the State‘s public health goals). 
 239. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669. The Court believed that the statute did not further physician 
confidentiality because ―[t]he explicit structure of the statute allows the information to be studied and 
used by all but a narrow class of disfavored speakers,‖ thus, the ―prescriber-identifying information 
[was therefore] available to an almost limitless audience.‖ Id. at 2668. 
 240. Id. at 2670. The Court did not challenge Vermont‘s assertion that the statute would lower the 
costs of medical services and promote public health; instead, it attacked what it characterized as ―the 
premise‖ of the statute: ―that the force of speech can justify the government‘s attempts to stifle it.‖ Id. 
at 2671. Instead, the Court reasoned that it was impermissible for ―[t]he State . . . [to] burden[] a form 
of protected expression that it found too persuasive‖ while ―l[eaving] unburdened those speakers 
whose messages are in accord with its own views.‖ Id. at 2672. 
 241. Samp, supra note 235, at 133 (emphasis added). 
 242. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 (emphasis added). 
 243. Id. at 2664. 
 244. Id. at 2666 (emphasis added). 
 245. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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heightened scrutiny, Justice Kennedy wrote: ―[t]he statute . . . disfavors 
marketing, that is, speech with a particular content. More than that, the 
statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.‖246 Also significant is the fact—pointed out by the dissent 
and at least one commentator—that the Court‘s ruling in Sorrell extended 
the protections of the First Amendment to an activity that was not 
previously recognized as speech: the buying and selling of data.
247
 In fact, 
the State had argued that ―heightened judicial scrutiny was unwarranted 
. . . because sales, transfer, and use of prescriber-identifying information 
are conduct, not speech,‖ and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
had essentially agreed with Vermont‘s argument, ―characteriz[ing] 
prescriber-identifying information as a mere ‗commodity‘ with no greater 
entitlement to First Amendment protection than ‗beef jerky.‘‖248 While the 
Supreme Court believed that ―there [was] a strong argument that 
prescriber-identifying information is speech for First Amendment 
purposes,‖ it concluded that the Vermont statute was entitled to heightened 
scrutiny, ―even assuming, as the State argues, that prescriber-identifying 
information is a mere commodity.‖249 The majority arrived at this 
conclusion by comparing Vermont‘s statute to ―a law prohibiting trade 
magazines from purchasing or using ink,‖ and reasoning that, ―[l]ike that 
hypothetical law, [the Vermont statute] imposes a speaker- and content-
based burden on protected expression, and that circumstance is sufficient 
to justify application of heightened scrutiny.‖250 In the majority‘s view, 
then, it did not matter that prescriber-identifying information was not 
speech, because, by limiting the sale of the information, Vermont‘s statute 
restricted pharmaceutical manufacturers‘ commercial speech by burdening 
their ability to effectively advertise brand-name drugs to doctors.  
 
 
 246. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 (emphasis added). The majority was also concerned about the fact 
that the statute singled out detailers. See id. (―Vermont‘s law . . . has the effect of preventing 
detailers—and only detailers—from communicating with physicians in an effective and informative 
manner.‖). 
 247. See id. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―Vermont‘s statute neither forbids nor requires 
anyone to say anything, to engage in any form of symbolic speech, or to endorse any particular point 
of view, whether ideological or related to the sale of a product.‖); Purdy, supra note 16, at 51 (―Sorrell 
. . . extended First Amendment protection beyond anything recognizable as speech. . . . [M]ost of what 
the . . . decision protects is not verbal expression or even political spending, but simply the sale of 
data.‖). 
 248. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2666 (emphasis added). 
 249. Id. at 2667. 
 250. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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III. ARE UNIONS PEOPLE TOO?  
A. The Legal Analysis 
Taken together, Citizens United and Sorrell indicate that the Supreme 
Court has embraced the neutrality principle—that the inherent worth of 
speech does not depend upon the identity of its source—at least when that 
principle can be used to strike down laws regulating corporations. Citizen 
United‘s articulation of the neutrality principle with respect to corporate 
political speech could not have been more categorical; Justice Kennedy‘s 
words bear repeating: ―the Government may not suppress political speech 
on the basis of the speaker‘s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental 
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations.‖251 Because the law the Court struck down in Citizens United 
restricted campaign spending by both corporations and unions, surely it 
follows that no governmental interest justifies limits on the political 
speech of unions.
252
 If the Court was willing to treat union boycotts as 
speech, Citizens United would undoubtedly lead to an invalidation of 
section 8(b)(4)(B)‘s prohibition of political boycotts. The rationale behind 
the Supreme Court‘s holding in ILA, however, remains a roadblock to this 
seemingly inevitable extension of Citizens United. In stating that union 
members‘ refusal to handle cargo from Russia was not protected activity 
under the First Amendment, the ILA Court explicitly relied on the fact that 
earlier cases had held that secondary picketing by labor unions was not 
protected speech. Because union secondary picketing was not protected, 
the Court reasoned, neither was a union‘s refusal to handle cargo.253  
The only way out of this doctrinal dead end is to recognize that the 
Supreme Court‘s insistence that secondary picketing is unprotected is in 
and of itself a violation of the neutrality principle that the Court has now 
wholeheartedly embraced. This is obvious if one looks at the three 
separate but interlinking doctrines that the Court has (inconsistently) relied 
on to reject constitutional challenges to section 8(b)(4)(B): the unlawful 
objectives test,
254
 the delicate balance rationale,
255
 and the speech-conduct 
 
 
 251. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
 252. The Court even relied on several union cases to support its holding in Citizens United. See 
supra note 221. 
 253. Supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. Although the Court did not explicitly rely on the 
delicate balance rationale in ILA, it seems to underlie the Court‘s outrage at the way that the union 
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distinction.
256
 As applied by the Court in the context of section 8(b)(4)(B), 
these standards can only be described as aberrations in the Court‘s First 
Amendment jurisprudence. The unlawful objectives test is the worst of the 
three; as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Safeco concurrence, the test 
essentially says that Congress can get around the requirements of the First 
Amendment by simply labeling ―the otherwise lawful expression of 
views‖ as ―unlawful‖ and therefore unprotected.257 The test has been 
rightly critiqued as ―circular and wholly deferential to legislative action,‖ 
because it allows ―[t]he state, whose actions the First Amendment is 
intended to limit, . . . to establish the parameters of First Amendment 
protection for labor picketing.‖258 If such a test were applied in the 
commercial speech context, it would mean that the Vermont legislature 
could get around the Court‘s ruling in Sorrell by enacting a statute that 
defined the purchase of prescriber-identifying information by 
pharmaceutical corporations as ―unlawful conduct‖ and then prohibiting 
that conduct; yet it strains the imagination to think of anyone using the 
unlawful objective test to defend such a statute without being laughed (or 
thrown) out of the court room. Because this test is applied only to speech 
by unions or their members, it cannot be reconciled with the neutrality 
principle.  
The delicate balance rationale—relied on by the Court in ILA and by 
Justice Blackmun in his Safeco concurrence
259—is similar to the unlawful 
objectives test and likewise conflicts with the neutrality principle. This 
rationale asserts that the Supreme Court cannot hold section 8(b)(4)(B) 
unconstitutional because it is Congress’s role to strike the delicate balance 
―between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral 
employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced 
participation in industrial strife.‖260 But this rationale is as flawed and 
discriminatory as the unlawful objectives test: while it is true that 
Congress has the power to regulate commerce, it has never been implied 
by the Court—outside of the context of union expression—that Congress‘s 
decision to regulate a certain type of expression strips that expression of 
 
 
went beyond its ―traditional‖ role and exercised its economic power for political purposes. See supra 
note 181 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 148–49, 160–63, and 183 and accompanying text. 
 257. Supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 258. Note, supra note 28, at 943. 
 259. See Int‘l Longshoremen‘s Ass‘n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int‘l, Inc (ILA), 456 U.S. 212, 226 
(1982) (―The labor law requires a careful balancing of interests.‖); supra note 146 and accompanying 
text (describing Justice Blackmun‘s concurring opinion). 
 260. Supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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First Amendment protection.
261
 The delicate balance standard could 
perhaps be justified before Citizens United: maybe the Court‘s adoption of 
the standard was premised on the idea that, by giving unions certain legal 
privileges through the NLRA, Congress gained a greater ability to regulate 
unions.
262
 But now that the Citizens United Court has categorically 
rejected the identical argument as applied to corporate speech,
263
 the 
delicate balance standard truly lacks any principled foundation.  
Finally, the validity of the speech-conduct distinction is likewise 
undermined by the neutrality principle. In the Court‘s nonlabor picketing 
jurisprudence, the Court has repeatedly stated that picketing is protected 
by the First Amendment.
264
 By formulating a standard under which 
secondary labor picketing is treated as unprotected conduct, the Court has 
committed the same sin that it accused Congress of in Citizens United
265
 
and the Vermont legislature of in Sorrell
266
: it has discriminated against 
disfavored speech by disfavored speakers. After all, there is surely no 
more flagrant violation of the neutrality principle than the Court‘s adopted 
rule—illustrated by ILA and Claiborne—that expression which ―rest[s] on 
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values‖ and ―is the 
 
 
 261. Cf., e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (―Congress exercises its 
conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution. . . . [U]nder the Commerce 
Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is constrained 
in the exercise of that power by the First Amendment.‖); FEC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 
364, 378 (1984) (―[A]lthough the Government's interest in ensuring balanced coverage of public issues 
is plainly both important and substantial, we have . . . made clear that broadcasters are engaged in a 
vital and independent form of communicative activity. As a result, the First Amendment must inform 
and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory power in this area.‖); Am. 
Commc‘ns Ass‘n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 446 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (―[T]he First 
Amendment was added after adoption of the Constitution for the express purpose of barring Congress 
from using previously granted powers to abridge belief or its expression.‖). 
 262. This could explain the ILA Court‘s ire at the fact that a labor union had used powers that 
were created by the NLRA to further ―a random political objective.‖ See supra note 181 and 
accompanying text. 
 263. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
 264. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (emphasis added) (concluding that 
picketing at a soldier‘s funeral by members of a fundamentalist church—displaying signs such as 
―God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,‖ ―God Hates Fags,‖ and ―Priests Rape Boys,‖—is ―speech 
. . . at a public place on a matter of public concern, [and] . . . is [therefore] entitled to ‗special 
protection‘ under the First Amendment‖); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980) (―There can be 
no doubt that [a statute] . . . prohibiting peaceful [nonunion] picketing on the public streets and 
sidewalks in residential neighborhoods . . . regulates expressive conduct that falls within the First 
Amendment‘s preserve.‖); Police Dep‘t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (―[P]icketing 
plainly involves expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment . . . .‖ (citations 
omitted)). 
 265. Cf. supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
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essence of self-government‖267 magically becomes coercive conduct not 
entitled to any First Amendment protection when used by unions.
268
  
Though it is not a picketing case, Sorrell undermines the speech-
conduct distinction in yet another way. Recall the Sorrell Court‘s 
reasoning that, even assuming that prescriber-identifying information is a 
mere commodity, not speech, heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate 
when a statute imposes a speaker- and content-based burden on protected 
expression.
269
 The Court‘s comparison of the Vermont law to ―a law 
prohibiting trade magazines from purchasing or using ink‖270 may have 
been somewhat inapt,
271
 but the Court‘s reasoning was straightforward: 
even if the sale of prescriber-identifying information is not speech, by 
prohibiting pharmaceutical corporations from purchasing such 
information, the Vermont law inhibited those corporations‘ ability to 
effectively engage in protected commercial speech. This argument is quite 
similar to Justice Black‘s concurring opinion in Tree Fruits, in which 
Black observed that, while some aspects of picketing may be classified as 
conduct, not speech, the fact that conduct ―is intertwined . . . with 
constitutionally protected free speech and press [means that] regulation of 
the non-protected conduct may at the same time encroach on freedom of 
speech and press.‖272 According to Black, ―it is the duty of courts . . . to 
weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons 
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights of 
speech and press.‖273 Perhaps the similarity of Justice Black‘s words to 
 
 
 267. Supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 148–49, 160–63, and 183 and accompanying text. For a more detailed 
argument that labor picketing is not inherently coercive, see Guza, supra note 44, at 1288–92. For 
example, Guza points out that, ―in an era of multinational conglomerates and powerful corporate 
interests, it seems unlikely that most forms of picketing will actually result in coercion.‖ Id. at 1288. 
But his most compelling argument is a purely legal one: ―if labor picketing is inherently coercive 
because of its combination of conduct and speech, then why should primary picketing be legal? In fact, 
if picketing always contains a conduct element, then why should any picketing—labor or otherwise—
be free of regulation?‖ Id. at 1290. 
 269. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text. The Court clearly recognized that 
pharmaceutical companies can advertise to doctors without prescriber-identifying information; such 
information merely makes their advertising more effective. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653, 2659 (2011) (―Salespersons can be more effective when they know the background and 
purchasing preferences of their clientele, and pharmaceutical salespersons are no exception.‖). 
 270. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (citations omitted).  
 271. It was inapt in the sense that a law prohibiting trade magazines from purchasing or using ink 
would mean that trade magazines would cease to exist. In contrast, the Vermont law merely makes the 
speech of pharmaceutical corporations less effective by taking away some of the information—albeit 
very valuable information—that the drug detailers relied on in making their sales pitches to doctors. 
 272. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 
58, 77 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
 273. Id. at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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those of the Sorrell majority are a portent of things to come. If the Court 
becomes willing to reevaluate its section 8(b)(4)(B) jurisprudence, it need 
look no further than Justice Black‘s concurrence in Tree Fruits or the 
Court‘s opinion in Thornhill to find straightforward articulations of the 
standards by which restraints on labor expression in the form of picketing 
should be judged.
274
 
B. The Real-World Prospects for Section 8(b)(4)(B)’s Demise 
Just as Citizens United should lead to an invalidation of section 
8(b)(4)(B)‘s prohibition of political secondary boycotts, Sorrell should 
lead to an invalidation of section 8(b)(4)(B)‘s prohibition on economic 
secondary boycotts. As stated in the Introduction, if the Sorrell Court was 
applying Citizens United‘s rationale to commercial speech—speech that is 
an economic activity—it follows that union speech, whether on political or 
economic matters, should receive no less protection than the economic 
speech of corporations, non-corporate institutions, and individuals. The 
legal critique of the unlawful objectives test, the delicate balance rationale, 
and the speech-conduct distinction applies equally to secondary political 
and economic boycotts. If history is any guide,
275
 however, even the most 
compelling legal argument against the constitutionality of section 
8(b)(4)(B) may not sway the Court. This is because, as James Atleson has 
pointed out, many judicial and administrative labor law decisions are 
based not on statutory language or legislative history,
276
 but instead on 
frequently unstated ―assumptions and values about the economic system 
and the prerogatives of capital, and corollary assumptions about the rights 
and obligations of employees.‖277 
Atleson gives several examples of such unstated assumptions and 
values, but two seem especially relevant in the context of the Court‘s 
section 8(b)(4)(B) jurisprudence: (1) ―continuity of production must be 
maintained, tempered only when statutory language clearly protects 
employee interference‖ and (2) ―employees, unless controlled, will act 
irresponsibly.‖278 The Court‘s secondary boycott case law is perhaps best 
understood as an ongoing struggle between these (and perhaps other) 
 
 
 274. See, e.g., Guza, supra note 44, at 1302 (―Because section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) restricts secondary 
labor picketing, while allowing other non-labor groups to engage in the same activities, the statute 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination. Justice Black realized this in his concurrence in Tree Fruits.‖). 
 275. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 276. ATLESON, supra note 83, at 2. 
 277. Id. at 10. 
 278. Id. at 7. 
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unstated assumptions and fundamental First Amendment values of the 
kind the Court relied on in Thornhill.
279
 This struggle helps to explain the 
Court‘s willingness to narrow section 8(b)(4)(B)‘s prohibitions in cases 
where the Court believed secondary boycotts would not have much effect 
(Tree Fruits
280
 and DeBartolo
281
) while affirming the prohibitions in cases 
where the Court believes secondary boycotts could do real harm to the 
secondary employer (Safeco
282
 and ILA
283
). Though the current Court may 
continue in the tradition of Tree Fruits and DeBartolo by progressively 
narrowing section 8(b)(4)(B)‘s secondary boycott prohibitions, the 
invalidation of section 8(b)(4)(B) on First Amendment grounds will 
require a Court that is willing to both acknowledge and abandon the 
unstated assumptions that are a fixture in much of labor law.  
CONCLUSION 
If Citizen United‘s postulate that ―the First Amendment stands against 
attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints‖ and ―[p]rohibit[s] . . . 
restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by 
some but not others‖284 is to have any meaning, the Court must apply it to 
its own case law, not just to legislative action it finds objectionable. 
Citizens United‘s formulation of the neutrality principle should lead the 
Court to either reinterpret section 8(b)(4)(B) so as not to apply to political 
secondary boycotts or strike the statute down on the grounds that it 
suppresses political speech on the basis of the speaker‘s identity as a 
union.
285
 Sorrell indicates that the former route is insufficient. Rather, the 
 
 
 279. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 284. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). 
 285. One final point from ILA should be addressed: the Court‘s refusal to exempt political 
boycotts from section 8(b)(4)(B) because ―[t]he distinction between labor and political objectives 
would be difficult to draw in many cases.‖ Int‘l Longshoremen‘s Ass‘n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int‘l, Inc., 
(ILA), 456 U.S. 212, 225 (1982). The ILA Court‘s concern about its own ability to distinguish between 
the purposes of speech seems disingenuous. The Supreme Court has regularly resolved corporate 
political speech cases and corporate commercial speech cases and has seemingly had no difficulty 
differentiating between the two categories of speech, yet the distinction between the two is far from 
obvious. After all, a compelling argument can be made that there is no such thing as political speech 
by corporations: ―when the speaker is a for-profit corporation the content [of the speech] is always, by 
virtue of the nature of the for-profit corporate structure, ‗commercial.‘ Even if the subject is not 
obviously commercial, the purpose of such speech is always to advance a commercial interest.‖ Piety, 
supra note 9, at 2593; see id. at 2623–34 (providing support for the position that corporate speech is 
always commercial). Surely if the Court can differentiate so easily between the political and 
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Court should strike down or at least apply a form of heightened scrutiny to 
section 8(b)(4)(B). After all, Sorrell not only reaffirmed the neutrality 
principle in the context of commercial speech, it also rejected the idea that 
speech which ―results from an economic motive‖ is entitled to less than 
heightened scrutiny;
286
 and it is difficult to see how the court could 
conclude that the labor speech in a case like Safeco does not have an 
economic motive. If it follows this analytical path, perhaps the Court will 
decide that section 8(b)(4)(B) is able to survive such heightened judicial 
scrutiny. But at the very least, labor speech will no longer be relegated to a 
state of limbo, somewhere on the periphery of the Court‘s First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Zoran Tasić  
 
 
commercial speech of corporations, it can do so with respect to the political speech and economic 
speech of unions. 
 286. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011). 
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